Social Policy Association Annual Conference 2006: The State of Welfare: Past, Present and Future
A report on the 2006 SPA conference that took place at the University of Birmingham 18– 20 July 2006; a longer version appeared originally in Policy World.
The 2006 Social Policy Association Conference took place in the middle of a record breaking heat-wave. Temperatures across the UK soared to unrecorded heights with an officially recorded peak of just under 37°C (around 100°F) – the hottest level in 95 years. But that was outside in the sunshine; inside the packed conference rooms on Birmingham University’s Edgbaston campus, hot bodies and heated debate must have pushed the temperature above 40°C on occasions and the weather, that staple of polite British conversation, threatened to displace social policy as the main topic of conversation. Fortunately, the conference organisers swiftly responded to this threat by bussing in gallons of bottled water, though there was little they could do to help speed the arrival of delegates whose train journeys were delayed by the usual buckled train-tracks that seemingly accompany any significant outbreak of sunshine in the UK.
Day 1
The theme of this year’s conference was ‘The State of Welfare: Past, Present and Future’ and the plenary sessions addressed each of these themes in turn. First up, on Tuesday afternoon, was a consideration of the past. Under the heading of ‘Reflections on the Post-1945 Welfare State’ the conference heard from Jose Harris (University of Oxford) and John Macnicol (London School of Economics).
Harris asked us to reconsider the link between the old Poor Law and the post-1945 welfare state, arguing the influence of the former on the latter was probably greater than is usually imagined. She felt that the presentation of ‘heroic’ stories of transformation in the early post-War period had resulted in an unbalanced picture of social policy before and after the War and, indeed, that a reassessment of the Poor Law might lead us to conclude that it was less dreadful than is commonly presumed.
Much of the discontent with the Poor Law, she argued, came from its use as a tool of economic, rather than social, policy. She noted that between 1830 and 1890 Britain’s GDP doubled but its welfare expenditure halved, not least because Poor Law spending was functionally linked to the Treasury’s core economic policy: the gold standard. Yet, a consideration of the detail of provision on the ground – such as the service provided by Poor Law hospitals – showed the Poor Law was far removed from the harsh Dickensian stereotype. While there was discontent, Harris suggested that it was often because people wanted more, not less, of what was being provided by the Poor Law system.
Warming up to the theme of the link between social and economic policy in the Poor Laws, she suggested a window of opportunity for policy change had opened in the inter-war years when the Poor Law’s value as an economic tool declined. There were many factors that contributed to this, including the failure (and subsequent abandonment) of the gold standard as an economic policy, but the Second World War was crucial, not least because it precipitated a move away from an emphasis on international trading that formed the core of Britain’s economy – and shift in focus towards producing essential goods and services internally instead – and because the City of London fell silent during the War too. With this changed economic context, Beveridge’s proposals for National Insurance became functionally suitable and tied in with the new economic orthodoxy propounded by the Treasury and by Keynes.
However, Harris observed there is ‘always a snake in Eden’ and suggested the post-War welfare reforms established in the wake of the Beveridge Report contained two. First, there was what she termed the ‘monetary snake’ that came in the form of inflation. As post-war life slowly returned to normal, demand for goods rose and so too, therefore, did prices. In turn, rising inflation reduced the real value of social security benefits more quickly than had been presumed. Secondly, Harris suggested there was an ‘administrative snake’ that came in the form National Assistance Board (NAB) whose role was to deal with means-tested benefits for the dwindling minority. Harris argued that these two snakes inter-twined as rising inflation lead to pressure for increased social spending, because the Conservative governments of 1951-64, while committed to the welfare state, gave a higher priority to re-establishing Britain’s role in the global money markets. Their strategy for balancing these competing demands of social and economic policy was simply to place more emphasis on means-tested benefits when allocating funds. Harris noted that by 1964, spending on the supposedly dwindling means-tested benefits actually exceeded that on the supposedly core national insurance benefits established in 1946. She argued that when Labour returned to office in that year they did little to reverse this situation and little has changed since.
Harris’ explanation for this was that the situation by 1964 merely reflected a return to the long-term orthodoxy: it was an inevitable outcome of the British economy’s return to its traditional global banking and financial services base and its move away from the temporary post-war emphasis on domestic production. Moreover, she suggested that the antecedents of the contemporary focus on selectivity can be seen here too. Ergo: the legacy of the Poor Law may have influenced current policy more firmly than is often suggested. Harris argued that a reassessment of the Poor Law might, therefore, lead to a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the British system. She offered the conference a few thoughts to take home on this topic:
• the Poor Law may have been more innovative and evolutionary than is often allowed
• the governance structures of the Poor Law were highly democratic and the elected boards were often very representative of their communities
• the vast majority of adult paupers applying for assistance were women, but they were only tenuously included in the universalist turn of the 1940s
• the Poor Law did not legally discriminate against the ‘undeserving’ poor – it actually legally forbade refusal of assistance on moral grounds – and much of the stigma came from general public attitudes rather than the Poor Law itself
• whereas Beveridge established a contractual basis for social support, the Poor Law offered absolutely unconditional rights to support that emanated from its ancient strictures. Beveridge does not, therefore, have a monopoly on the morality of rights.
Harris was followed by John Macnicol who addressed some of the dilemmas that face those trying to analyse social policy from an historical perspective. There were problems, he argued, in handling structure against agency, in deciding whether to place an emphasis on continuity or change and in the temptation to periodise policy eras when policy often evolves in an incremental manner. However, rising to the challenge of reviewing 61 years of policy in just 25 minutes, Macnicol offered us a three-part periodisation of the post-War British welfare state.
Firstly, he suggested, we had the period of the ‘classic welfare state’ that began in the immediate aftermath of the war and with the implementation of the key recommendations of the Beveridge report. He noted that hindsight was a wonderful thing and that many key issues were simply not addressed or were given scant attention in the 1950s – educational disadvantage, NHS underinvestment, poverty and inequality for instance – but felt there was no real shift in the core policy frameworks in this decade. The cracks, however, were beginning to show in the 1960s and in terms of picking a year which marks the end of the ‘classic welfare state’, Macnicol thought 1965 was a good candidate: it was the year the Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) were formed and that President Johnson launched his war on poverty in the USA.
However, 1973 was the year that he picked as marking the watershed moment: the Yom-Kippur war and the oil crisis lead to a speeding up of economic change in the UK. He argued that from this date we saw a second period of social policy: one marked by much tighter budgetary control and major shifts in the role of the state. 1973 marked the peak of council housing and the dilution of comprehensive schooling soon followed. Major demographic and family changes took place during this second phase and, of course, Thatcher played a significant role in repositioning the state too.
Indeed, for Macnicol, Thatcher’s role is such that her departure effectively marked the end of this second period of social policy, the final of his three eras being that from 1990 to the present day. He suggested that the social policy of the John Major was well worth investigating, for while he continued many of the Thatcher reforms, her governments had only really turned their attention to social policy in the late 1980s, so many of the reforms were somewhat immature or were still ongoing when Major came. Marketisation of the NHS and the promotion of greater diversity in the format of schools were two key examples he highlighted here. Moreover, Macnicol argued that many of these reforms had strong similarities to those pursued by New Labour. It was because of these similarities – and some of the common pressures such as the increased economic globalisation in the post-Cold War era – that lead to him grouping the Major and Blair governments together in this way.
The first day of the conference also included a pre-dinner address from the SPA President Polly Toynbee. She told the conference that the present was something of an ‘odd time’ for welfare. There was, she argued, a great deal of cynicism that often denigrated the welfare state: from some parts of the media, from the new Conservatives and from the government themselves. With an often weary government drifting towards the final days of the Blair era, there was a real danger that this cynicism may pose some real perils for the welfare state.
Toynbee noted that despite the increased investment in public services, people were still not satisfied with them and often tell pollster that they do not believe things have improved. Yet, they also tell pollsters that their own local school or hospital is good and reconcile the two views by regarding their own experiences as lucky in the face of poor national services. Toynbee worried that the government’s response to this has not been to mount a stout defence but, instead, a buckling at the knees. She firmly believes that things are getting better - that a decade of New Labour has made a difference - but we face a situation where a politician brave enough to say this clearly, as Patricia Hewitt did when addressing Unison delegates about the NHS, is likely to ridiculed or hauled down.
At the same time, Toynbee was keen to note that New Labour’s reforms have been far from perfect. She argued that instead of rallying enthusiasm for the welfare state they have been trying to become more like their predecessors in many areas, often divesting the state of its responsibilities for provision. Toynbee worried about the impact of this on public ethos and asked where the line between public and private ought to be drawn.
Toynbee also had some harsh words for the latest idea to become flavour of the month with the main political parties: the ‘new localism’. She worried about the impact breaking up the centre would have on the idea of the state and wondered if the government had thought about what might happen if responsibility for key social policies is devolved to local communities that are hostile to them. Indeed, she argued that the evidence shows people want good quality, national and universal services – they do not want devolution or local variation in services.
Toynbee concluded by saying there was a need to get back to first principles and praise what is good about the welfare state we have. She asked where the loud voices raised in praise of the state and the good work it is doing are and concluded that many of them are to be found in the SPA. But she reminded the conference that, from time-to-time, there is need to send out a message of support to the welfare state – otherwise it may be too late to do so.
Day 2
The second plenary session – titled ‘Neglected States of Welfare’ – examined the present. Gary Craig (Hull University) and Jean Carabine (Open University) shared the platform on what was the official hottest day on record.
Gary Craig spoke first and addressed the neglected issue of ‘race’. He argued that the overarching nature of discourse around minorities has not been a positive debate about welfare rights but a negative one - with often racist overtones - about the impact of immigration. He said that the ‘war-on-terror’ was bringing an even more hostile tone for certain minority groups and forcefully argued that sections of the press were now out-of-control, printing downright lies about certain groups, safe in the knowledge they will not be punished. The failure of state to enforce anti-racism laws in such instances was, he suggested, shameful. Craig’s critique of the state went further. He suggested the state was not only failing to confront racism, but that its own race relations mechanisms are inadequate too. In particular, he pointed to the way in which many public sector bodies were failing to carry out even some of the most basic tasks that are necessary such as collecting relevant data on its service users. ‘Race’ is relevant dimensions when studying poverty, employment and housing trends, for instance, yet the state’s own data often lacks robustness in these fields. This, Craig suggested, was indicative of the merely marginal concern the British state has with regard to the welfare of ethnic minorities. Craig also had some words of admonishment for the social policy academic community too. He argued that it is still far from uncommon for social policy academic texts to overlook or underplay issues of ‘race’ and that this lacuna extends to social research too. In particular, he suggested there was an absence of coverage in high levels journals – with the honourable exception of Critical Social Policy.
Jean Carabine then spoke on the neglected issues of ‘sex and sexuality’. She argued there was a very rich research agenda that is opened up if we consider the ways in which sexuality and sex might be important to social policy. While these issues are very private and intimate, invoking a complex web of notions, she argued they were not just about what we do but about cultural values attached to sexuality also. Indeed, she argued that sex and sexuality are, in fact, far from private matters in many spheres of social policy, particularly when sexuality falls outside the ‘norm’. Firstly, she suggested, there are areas of social policy where sex or sexuality is the explicit focus of social policy. She noted that social policy often tries to directly control sexuality – in terms of reducing teenage pregnancy for instance. Secondly, there we areas of social policy which speak of sexuality but it is not the explicit focus. Housing policy, for instance, can convey assumptions about sexuality. Finally, she noted that there where many areas of policy where the issues of sex and sexuality are ignored when they are relevant to the needs of individual citizens.
Day 3
The final day of the conference focused on ‘The Future of the Welfare State’, the theme of a plenary session in which Joakim Palme (The Futures Institute, Stockholm) and Stephan Liebfried (University of Bremen) delivered talks. Palme explored the Swedish model of welfare from its origins through to its proclaimed crisis of the 1990s and beyond. In terms of its origins, Palme noted that these were rooted in both political and economic structures. He argued that though the 1930s depression had been crucial in terms of promoting earnings related social insurance benefits, the model had modernised as a response to changes in the labour market – particularly greater female participation and in response to increased ageing of the population. The Swedish model, consequently, delivers low levels of poverty across the life-cycle, low levels of inequality, high levels of employment and high female participation in the labour market while maintaining broad social support.
However, he suggested the 1990s had been a dramatic decade for Sweden, both in terms of its social policy and its economic policy. Palme was part of a commission appointed in 1999 to review the impact of these changes. He highlighted some of the key reforms that had been implemented during this period, including a tightening of some core social security benefits and a reduction in their generosity, greater rationing of some key social services and more user charges and increased concentration of support on those with the greatest need for assistance. In terms of a ‘balance sheet’, these changes had resulted in some things getting worse – employment terms, unemployment, stress and health – but some things had also improved – wages, education and life expectancy. Similarly, while class and gender divisions had remained largely as they were beforehand, divisions around age and ‘race’ were becoming more prominent. In terms of inequality, the pattern of change was complex too: if capital gains were excluded then the there had been little change to the Gini index scores for Sweden, but including it showed a degree of flux. All this hinted at the future challenges he expected for the Swedish model; in particular, he suggested ageing, capital mobility and regional variations would be key policy issues for the model in the coming years.
Liebfried explored the possibility of a social Europe and, more particularly, how the federal structure of the EU might shape future social policies to emerge at the European level. To do this, he drew on an extensive analysis of how federalism had impacted on social policy development in individual countries, but noted that in most developed countries that federalism came before the welfare state rather than the other way around. Indeed, the fact that the EU faces such well developed welfare states may well be the greatest barrier to a social Europe, particularly given the wide variations in welfare regimes see across the continent. He noted that it was somewhat ironic that the moment at which a social model seemed most probable was likely to have been at the time of the Europe of six, for the founder members had the same type of welfare regime. Yet, he was also keen to stress that the EU now has more competency for social policy than the pre-New Deal federal government did in the USA, so the future was by no means certain. Nevertheless, his analysis suggested that federal structures offer by-passes that can undermine social policy development and, given the EU’s structures - particularly its lack of tax raising powers - the most likely future for social policy at the EU level is that of a fairly limited regulatory model.
